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I. INTRODUCTION
Environmental tort litigation often reveals causal
indeterminacy on both sides of the caption: indeterminate plaintiffs
and indeterminate defendants. A cardinal tenet of traditional tort
law liability rules is that the plaintiff must prove that the
defendant's conduct was a producing cause of the harm suffered.
In the conventional sporadic accident case, identifying the
responsible defendant is usually not difficult because of the
availability of physical or direct evidence that implicates a
particular defendant. In toxic and environmental harm cases,
however, the chemical agent or polluting source often does not
come branded or trademarked with the defendant's name. While
defendant or source indeterminacy arose occasionally in products
liability cases and accident cases, the frequency and difficulty of
source indeterminacy in environmental and toxic torts create new
demands on the courts to develop rules that continue to fulfill the
objectives of tort law.
Several courts in diverse circumstances have found plaintiff-
favorable procedural or substantive law means to permit the
plaintiff to recover against single members of a pool of
indeterminate defendants. The situations in which such recoveries
would be permitted have been quite limited, largely because courts
have, to date, confined application of these legal devices to suits
involving products that were identical in chemical composition.
Put another way, since a molecule of diethylstilbestrol ("DES") is
identical to any other molecule of DES, many courts felt free to
attach some form of proportionate liability to all negligent
manufacturers of DES, even though the producer of the DES
ingested by the mother of a particular plaintiff could not be
determined. In contrast, as asbestos is not one mineral but rather a
family of distinguishable minerals, each with a different disease
causing potential, even courts that adopted novel approaches to
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DES litigation refused to apply these procedures to asbestos
litigation.
This article describes two recent decisions that could foretell
new and more liberal approaches to market share liability.' In one
suit involving a child who suffered lead paint poisoning, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court, applying that state's law, held that for
application of market share liability, it was not necessary that the
paint, as marketed by numerous manufacturers over the years, be
identical, which of course it was not.2 Instead, the court held it
was sufficient that the bio-accessibility of the toxic component,
lead carbonate, be identical in each defendant's products, which it
was.3 In the second decision, a New York federal trial judge in a
multi-district litigation involving methyl tertiary butyl ether
("MTBE") specified numerous jurisdictions she anticipated would
apply market share liability to MTBE suits, even though the
concentrations of MTBE, and thus their toxicity, varied in virtually
every suit.
4
The article concludes with a discussion of the potential
applicability of these two innovative decisions to litigation
involving other products or processes and, more broadly, the effect
that any such applicability might have to the certainty, fairness,
and predictability of toxic tort litigation.
II. SINDELL V. ABBOTTLABORATORIES
A. The Path to Sindell
Traditional principles of tort law require proof, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that a plaintiff suffered an injury, 5
caused by a particular defendant's conduct. In the conventional
sporadic accident case, identification of responsible defendants is
not difficult, as causation can be determined by the availability of
physical or direct evidence that implicates a particular defendant.6
1. See discussion infra Part V.A-B.
2. See generally Thomas ex rel. Gramling v. Mallet, 701 N.W.2d 523
(Wis. 2005).
3. Id. at 559.
4. See generally In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether ("MTBE") Prod. Liab.
Litig., 379 F. Supp. 2d 348 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
5. See, e.g., Dan B. Dobbs, THE LAW OF TORTS § 166, at 405 (3d ed.
2000); see generally Allen Rostron, Beyond Market Share Liability: A Theory of
Proportional Share Liability for Nonfungible Products, 52 UCLA L. REv. 151,
159 (2004).
6. Dobbs, supra note 5, at 405-06. See also Randy S. Parlee, Comment,
Overcoming the Identification Burden in DES Litigation: The Market Share
Liability Theory, 65 MARQ. L. REv. 609, 609-10 (1982). Parlee points out that
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In other circumstances, such as (1) where one of multiple
defendants may have caused the harm, (2) there is a substantial
period of time between the harmful conduct and the putative
plaintiff's awareness of it, or (3) a combination of both, it may be
difficult-if not impossible-to determine the manufacturer of
fungible or uniform products.7 The judicial response to this
problem of source indeterminacy has been the creation of
mechanisms to ease the plaintiff's burden.8  Much of the law in
this area has developed in the cases involving the synthetic
hormone miscarriage preventative DES.9
Numerous cases filed in the 1970s against manufacturers of
DES brought market share liability to center stage.' From 1947
until 1971, millions of R regnant women took the drug as a
miscarriage preventative. 1 From the beginning, the medical
community raised serious questions about the safety and
effectiveness of DES for preventing miscarriages. 12  The
companies marketing, manufacturing, and distributing DES failed
to test whether it affected fetuses in animals or humans, even
though they specifically marketed DES for pregnancy use.13
According to two medical studies, it would have taken just six
months for tests on mice to reveal the danger of cancer when the
the judiciary has become an advocate for protecting consumers more than
manufacturers because it has realized that the complexity of products and the
long chain of distribution have put consumers at a disadvantage. Id.
7. Richard E. Kaye, "Concert of Activity," "Alternate Liability,"
"Enterprise Liability," or Similar Theory as Basis for Imposing Liability Upon
One or More Manufacturers of Defective Uniform Product, in Absence of
Identification of Manufacturer of Precise Unit or Batch Causing Injury, 63
A.L.R.5th 195 (1998).
8. M. Stuart Madden & Gerald W. Boston, THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL
AND Toxic TORTS: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 541 (3d ed. 2001).
9. Id. The first DES case to go to trial resulted in a jury verdict against the
plaintiff because the jury concluded that the plaintiff had failed to meet her
burden of proving that the named defendant had indeed manufactured the injury-
causing DES. See Barros v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., No. 75-1226 (E.D. Pa.
Jan. 27, 1978).
10. Rostron, supra note 5, at 159. DES is a synthetic substance that
duplicates the activity of estrogen, a female hormone crucial to sexual
development and fertility. Id.
11. See Sindell v. Abbot Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 925 (Cal. 1980).
12. See Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 436 N.Y.S.2d 625, 629 (N.Y. App. Div.
1981) (describing evidence that prominent Chicago physiologists had
administered DES to rats and mice in 1939 and concluded that the hormone
crossed the placenta and had malforming action on the fetus).
13. Rostron, supra note 5, at 159.
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offspring reached maturity. 14 In 1971, the Federal Food and Drug
Administration ("FDA") put an end to the use of DES for
miscarriage prevention after scientists discovered that daughters of
women who took DES during pregnancy had unusually high rates
of certain rare forms of cervical and vaginal cancer. 15 By the time
of the FDA ban, as many as 300 companies had produced DES for
sale. 16
Many DES daughters seeking to recover compensation for their
injuries faced a severe problem identifying the manufacturer or
manufacturers of the DES consumed by their mothers.17 While all
manufacturers produced DES according to substantially the same
chemical formula, they sold it in a wide variety of forms.' If the
adverse effects of the drug had appeared quickly after use,
conceivably many users would have been able to identify the
manufacturer of the DES they consumed based on their
recollection of the product's appearance or from records of their
pharmacy's source of supply. Instead, the harm did not manifest
itself for a generation. 
19
14. See Bichler, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 629. Expert testimony presented in the
Bichler trial established the available scientific knowledge at the time of the
FDA application and indicated that it was well-known that substances ingested
by pregnant women would pass through the placenta to the fetus. Id. The trial
court allowed the jury to infer from the evidence of consciously parallel
behavior that an implied agreement existed between Eli Lilly and other drug
companies to market DES for problems of human pregnancy without first
conducting tests with DES upon mice. Id. at 630.
15. Sindell, 607 P.2d at 925. Clear-celled adenocarcinoma is a rare and
deadly form of cancer. Boeken v. Phillip Morris Inc., 127 Cal. App. 4th 1640,
1649-52 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005). The increased incidence of this disease from
only three ever reported cases to 250 cases in 1975 initially alerted researchers
to the causal connection between DES and cancer. See Parlee, supra note 6, at
613 n.24.
16. See, e.g., Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 N.E.2d 324, 328 (I11. 1990).
17. See Sindell, 607 P.2d at 927. The court estimated that the number of
women who took the drug during pregnancy ranged from 1.5 million to 3
million. Id. Hundreds, perhaps thousands, of the daughters of these women
suffer from adenocarcinoma, and the incidence of vaginal adenosis among them
is thirty to ninety percent. Id.
18. Id. at 932-33.
19. Id. at 929. The court reasoned that the complaint charged that
defendants processed DES from a "common and mutually agreed upon
formula," allowing pharmacists to treat the drug as a "fungible commodity" and
to fill prescriptions from whatever brand of DES they had on hand at the time.
Id. at 932. Courts have explained that, in the DES cases, it is not definite that
the negligent party is before the court, and the defendants are not in a better
position to determine who was the negligent party. See, e.g., id.
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A number of circumstances contributed to the barrier of
establishing causation in fact in these cases. By the time a DES
daughter developed cancer or other reproductive system problems
and identified DES as a likely cause, the chances of identifying a
manufacturer were slim. Many mothers could no longer recall the
brand or appearance of the drug they had consumed or even
remember the pharmacy from which they had obtained it.21 If the
mothers knew the pharmacy and it remained in business, the
memories of the pharmacists who remained had faded, and their
records had long since been destroyed or lost.22 Contributing to
the lack of records is the fact that the manufacturers were not
required by law to maintain records for long 3eriods of time, and
some of these manufacturers no longer existed. 3
Under these difficult circumstances, only a small minority of
DES plaintiffs could identify the maker of the DES taken by their
mothers. Faced with the possibility of leaving the majority of DES
daughters without a remedy, theories of tort law had to evolve in
order to provide redress. To date, the judicial response to this and
related problems of source indeterminacy has been the creation of
mechanisms to ease the plaintiffs burden of showing which
particular defendant(s) caused the harm. This has most commonly
been achieved by shifting to the defendant(s) the burden of proof
of establishing non-causation. Much of the law in this area has
developed in the DES cases. Its origin, however, is found in a
lawsuit arising from a simple hunting accident.
20. See Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 343 N.W.2d 164, 175 (Mich. 1984) (citing
Michigan statutory law that requires the preservation of prescription records for
only five years). See Products Liability: Necessity and Sufficiency of
Identification of Defendants As Manufacturers and Sellers of Product Alleged to
Have Caused Injury, 51 A.L.R.3d 1344, 1349 (1973) ("It is obvious that to hold
a producer or seller liable for injury caused by a particular product, there must
first be proof that the defendant produced, sold, or was in some way responsible
for the product."). The identification requirement is, of course, a facet of the
factual causation element of tort law as a means of limiting the scope of
potential liability. Causation requirements also reflect common notions of moral
responsibility or blame. Abel, 343 N.W.2d at 170-74.
21. See Martin v. Abbot Labs., 689 P.2d 368 (Wash. 1984). In this action
against manufacturers of DES initiated by a woman who contracted cancer after
the drug was taken by her mother, the court adopted what it called "market-share
alternative liability," where the plaintiff could sue one or more manufacturers
who produced the DES taken by her mother. Id.
22. Id. at 371. See also Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004, 1007
(D.S.C. 1981).
23. Ryan, 514 F. Supp. at 1007.
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1. Alternative Liability
The modem origin of the burden-shifting approach to tortfeasor
indeterminacy is found in Summers v. Tice,2 a hunting accident
case. The plaintiff was shot in the eye and in the lip from either of
two guns fired negligently by two other hunters.2 5 The negligence
of the two hunters was in shooting at a form they thought to be
lawful 2rey without first determining if it might be another
hunter.2  Understandably, the plaintiff could not prove by a
preponderance of the evidence which of the two hunters actually
injured him, as the most he could show was that it was equally
likely that each was the source of that bullet.27 The California
Supreme Court was moved by its appreciation that the plaintiff ran
the risk of not being able to recover for his proved harm, as well as
the concomitant risk that two negligent hunters would not be held
to account for their actions.28
In its prominent opinion, the California Supreme Court devised
alternative liability to solve the source indeterminacy of plaintiff's
harm. As a matter of fairness, rather than foreclosing a potential
recovery by the innocent plaintiff, the court required the
defendants to prove that they did not cause the plaintiffs injury.29
Underlying the court's decision were such factors as: (1) the
plaintiffs inability, through no fault of his own, to identify the
tortfeasor; (2) the joint culpability of the defendants, in that both
fired negligently at a target they had not determined to be prey; and
(3) the defendants' superior position, when contrasted to that of the
plaintiff, to prove which one caused the injury.30 The resulting
doctrine of Summers was that if one defendant could exculpate
24. 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948). Evidence did not clearly show which of the two
defendant hunters' shots struck plaintiff, finding that pellets lodged in the
plaintiff's eye and lip as a result of shots fired by "defendants[,] and each of
them" was a sufficient finding that defendants were jointly liable and that
negligence of both was the cause of injury. Id. at 1, 4. See Martin, 689 P.2d at
375-77 (strict application of alternative liability does not provide DES plaintiffs
with a cause of action); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B(3), at 441-
42 (1965).
25. Summers, 199 P.2d at 1-2.
26. Id. at 2.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1-2. An economic view of such a result might be that if one of the
hunters was not ultimately found accountable, the incident would have the
destabilizing and inefficient aspects of a forced taking. Id. at 4. But see Jackson
v. Anchor Packing Co., 994 F.2d 1295 (8th Cir. 1993) (rejecting alternative
liability because state law did not recognize alternative or market share liability).
29. Summers, 199 P.2d at 4.
30. Id.
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himself, then the other would be wholly liable for the damages. If
neither could show that he did not shoot the plaintiff, then the two
would be jointly and severally liable. 31
At first glance, the alternative liability theory of Summers
should have considerable appeal to plaintiffs in the types of
defendant indeterminacy lawsuits so frequent in environmental tort
litigation. However appealing, though, its application was limited
by its own terms. The requirement that all or at least one of the
potential defendants be negligent was not the principal stumbling
block for, as will be seen below, such a requirement is typical for
each of the devices courts have adopted in indeterminate defendant
cases. Indeed, to get past dismissal on the pleadings, the same
would be true of any civil lawsuit. Rather, the primary limitation
on the Summers alternative liability theory is that all of the
potential tortfeasors must be before the court.32 In ordinary civil
litigation, procedural rules may place a premium on bringing a
single, comprehensive suit, but none subject the plaintiff to
dismissal on the pleadings for lack thereof; under the Summers
alternative liability theory, however, failure to bring suit against all
defendants would be fatal to the plaintiff's case. The logic of this
limitation on the Summers theory is apparent when one considers
the application of burden-shifting to the situation where one or
more tortfeasors has not been named as a party. The potential
would exist that all of the named defendants could sustain their
burden of proof, and the plaintiff would remain as remediless as he
or she would be without the Summers approach. That the plaintiff
would be left no worse off than before would not by itself be a
flaw, save for the fact that an ordinary predicate for changes in the
law, be they procedural or substantive, is that the changes will aid
a person, a class of persons, or a policy.
31. See M. Stuart Madden & David G. Owen, MADDEN AND OWEN ON
PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 12.3 (3d ed. 2000).
32. Summers, 199 P.2d 1. The rule developed in Summers has been
embodied in the Restatement of Torts. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
433B(3), at 441-42 (1965) (all actors' conduct must be tortious). A hypothetical
modification of alternative liability is offered by Judge Weinstein in the Agent
Orange cases many decades after Summers. See In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab.
Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 826-32 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). But see Hurt v. Philadelphia
Hous. Auth., 806 F. Supp. 515, 531-34 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (declining to apply the
alternative liability theory in lead-based paint litigation). See also Bichler v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 436 N.Y.S.2d 625, 632 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981) ("[I]t does not strain
one's sense of fairness to allow a limited expansion of the doctrine of concerted
action to cover the type of circumstances faced in DES cases .... ").
2007]
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2. Concert ofAction Liability
A second means of relieving the plaintiff of the need to identify
an individual tortfeasor from a field of potential tortfeasors (none
of whom was more likely than not the producing cause of
plaintiffs injuries) has been to identify a group or class of persons
who acted in concert with one another to bring about the harmful
consequence. The concert of action theory posits that when a
group of actors agree, whether explicitly or tacitly, to proceed in
risk-creating behavior, each of the actors will be jointly and
severally liable if that behavior results in injury to another. 33
When translated to the toxic tort context, the potential for concert
of action liability might arise when two or more manufacturers of a
particular product or pharmaceutical have expressly or impliedly
agreed to follow a similar pattern of conduct (usually in research,
manufacturing, or marketing methods) that justifies treating them
as jointly and severally liable. Under these circumstances, a
plaintiff could sue one of the actors in the group and hold it liable
for all of the damages suffered. Though initially attractive to
potential DES plaintiffs, the concert of action theory was almost
impossible to pursue. While a showing of parallel behavior was
straightforward, demonstrating any agreement between or among
the manufacturers was a practically insurmountable barrier.
34
3. Enterprise or Industry- Wide Liability
The last significant initiative some courts applied prior to
Sindell in order to facilitate plaintiffs' burden of defendant
identification was that of enterprise liability. The pioneer case in
this area was Hall v. E.L Du Pont De Nemours & Co. 35 In Hall,
33. The analogy often used is that of two automobile or motorcycle drivers
pulled up at the same stoplight. By a nod or by simple eye contact, they affirm
that they will race each other when the light turns green. If their joint race ends
up hurting a third party, both drivers or riders will be liable for the harm. This
will be true even if it is clearly only one vehicle that injured the plaintiff, such
as, e.g., only one of the two vehicles skids out of control and injures a
pedestrian.
34. One opinion of the New York Court of Appeals utilized the theory in an
early DES case. See Bichler, 436 N.E.2d at 183-87. In New York, at least, the
concert of action approach has been abandoned in favor of that jurisdiction's
version of market share liability. See Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d
1069, 1074 (N.Y. 1989).
35. 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). Hall is typically credited with
establishing the enterprise liability theory. However, it is more accurate to say
the theory was suggested by the court because the case's procedural posture
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some exploding blasting caps injured a group of children. 36 Even
though the specific manufacturer of the blasting caps that actually
caused the injuries could not be determined, suit was brought on
the children's behalf against the manufacturers. 3 7 There were only
a limited number of manufacturers of blasting caps, and they were
represented by a trade association that had been, over the years,
very active in its attempts to fend off various legislative and
regulatory safety initiatives. 38 The plaintiffs sued the small group
of manufacturers and their association, claiming that in acting
together and-through their trade association-in steadfastly
opposing safety and labeling regulation, the manufacturers needed
only to comply with lax industry-imposed safety standards.39 The
plaintiffs' claim survived a motion to dismiss, and the court held
that if the blasting cap manufacturers and their association had
"joint or group control of the risk," liability could be imposed on
each of the manufacturers without the need to show which
manufacturer had produced the caps that caused the injuries.40 The
enterprise liability theory is thus a hybrid theory combining
elements of alternative liability and concert of action.41 More
specifically enterprise liability: (1) incorporates the alternative
liability requirement that, in regard to the plaintiff, each actor is at
fault; and (2) provides that the group's pursuits through their trade
association provide circumstantial evidence of a concert of action.
The most significant limitation on the enterprise liability
approach to environmental tort litigation is the court's quite
specific comment that the theory was only suited to claims
involving a small group of defendants. To date, the courts have
not specifically embraced enterprise liability in an environmental
tort case.
B. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories and Its Boundaries
With the various and specific limitations imposed upon each of
the above approaches intended to favor the plaintiff in his or her
multi-defendant claim, it is not surprising that facts would arise in
which none of these approaches would work, and courts would
leaves its authority in question. Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 934 n.22
(Cal. 1980).
36. Hall, 345 F. Supp. at 358-59.
37. Id. at 358.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 359.
40. Id.
41. See Madden & Owen, supra note 3 1, at § 12.3.
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once again be importuned to find a remedy where before there was
none. Such facts would arise in the context of DES litigation. In
the California Supreme Court's seminal decision, Sindell v. Abbott
Laboratories,42 the court adopted the new approach of market
share liability, which the court concluded provided justice to the
injured claimants while inflicting no unfairness on defendants.
In Sindell, the plaintiff, Judith Sindell, sought to impose tort
liability on the defendant pharmaceutical manufacturers, alleging
that her mother was given DES while pregnant as a miscarriage
preventative. 43 Sindell eventually developed bladder malignancy
and related medical problems that she asserted were caused by her
mother's ingestion of DES. 44 The plaintiff sought to impose tort
liability using existing collective liability theories, contending that
DES was produced from a common and mutually agreed upon
formula "as a fungible drug interchanged with other brands of the
same product,' '  and that the defendant manufacturers
"collaborated in marketing, promoting, and testing the drug, relied
upon each other's tests, and adhered to an industry-wide safety
standard. 46  The plaintiff contended further that the defendant
manufacturers were jointly and severally liable to her "because
they acted in concert, on the basis of express and implied
agreements, and in reliance upon and ratification and exploitation
of each other's testing and marketing methods.
'A7
As suggested above, and as was true also of claims brought by
other DES daughters, Sindell's ability to establish a traditional tort
cause of action was hindered by her inability to identify the
specific producer of the DES that her mother ingested.48 Like
many cases before Sindell, the causation factors weighed heavily
against her due to the following factors: the significant number of
firms that had produced the drug; the number of such
manufacturers that had ceased doing business altogether in the
intervening years; the passage of many years since the ingestion of
the drug due to the long latency period before the adverse effects
on the female children of the mothers became clinically
42. 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980).
43. Id. at 925-26.
44. Id. at 926.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. It was alleged by plaintiff that during the period of marketing DES,
the defendant manufacturers, collectively, knew or should have known that it
was a carcinogenic substance and that it was ineffective to prevent miscarriages.
Id. See also Parlee, supra note 6, at 612-13.
48. Sindell, 607 P.2d at 926-27.
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observable; and the destruction or loss of marketing and
manufacturing records of the producers.49
The first cause of action alleged that defendants were jointly
and individually negligent in that they manufactured, marketed,
and promoted DES as a safe and effective drug to prevent
miscarriage without adequate testing or warning and without
monitoring or reporting its effects.50 A separate cause of action
alleged that defendants were jointly liable regardless of which
particular brand of DES was ingested by plaintiff's mother because
defendants collaborated in marketing, promoting, and testing the
drug; relied upon each other's tests; and adhered to an industry-
wide safety standard.51 "Other causes of action were based upon
theories of strict liability, violation of express and implied
warranties, false and fraudulent representations, misbranding of
drugs in violation of federal law, conspiracy[,] and lack of
consent. ' 52  The trial court sustained the defendants' demurrers
without leave to amend on the ground that plaintiff did not and
could not identify which defendants had manufactured the drug
responsible for her injury.53
After reviewing the trial court's dismissal, the California
Supreme Court turned to the numerous cases filed throughout the
country seeking to hold drug manufacturers liable for injuries
allegedly resulting from DES prescribed to the plaintiffs' mothers
since 1947. 54  The review revealed that hundreds, perhaps
thousands, of women whose mothers had taken DES suffered from
adenocarcinoma, and the incidence of vaginal adenosis among
them was thirty to ninety percent.55 While most of these cases
were still pending at the time, the California court noted two
exceptions. In those two exceptions, judgments had been entered
in favor of the defendant drug companies due to the plaintiffs'
inability to identify the manufacturer of the DES prescribed to their
mothers. 5
6
49. Id. at 929-30.
50. Id. at 926. See also Parlee, supra note 6, at 612.
51. Sindell, 607 P.2d at 926.
52. Id. For a discussion of the reasons underlying the inapplicability of
these theories, see Kaye, supra note 7, at 184.
53. Sindell, 607 P.2d at 926. The trial court did not specify the ground upon
which the demurrers were sustained. Points and authorities submitted by the
parties to the court emphasized identification failure as the source of injuries,
and that basis was assumed for purposes of appeal. Id.
54. Id. at 927.
55. Id. See, e.g., Collins v. Eli Lilly & Co., 342 N.W.2d 37, 45 (Wis. 1984)
(estimating that as many as 1000 class action or individual suits were pending
against DES manufacturers in 1971).
56. Sindell, 607 P.2d at 927-28.
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Aware that the conventional rule requiring defendant
determinacy was denying and would continue to deny DES
daughters compensation for their harm, the Sindell court explored
the then-extant exceptions to the rule that might be applicable to
the plaintiff.57 It first examined the alternative liability approach
of Summers v. Tice58 and found it unsuited to application in the
DES context, as it was practically certain that not all potential
tortfeasors were before the court.' A concert of action claim, the
California court held, was also inappropriate, as the DES plaintiff
was unable to show an agreement between and among any two or
more of the manufacturers of DES.60 Nor was industry-wide or
enterprise liability a fit.6 1 In a leading decision applyiniconcert of
action liability, Hall v. E.. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 2 in which
the injured plaintiff had been unable to pinpoint the specific
manufacturer of the device that had caused him injury, the court
permitted recovery based upon a showing that the small group of
cap manufacturers that dominated the market had acted jointly to
delegate to their trade association responsibility for advancing
opposition to stricter labeling regulation, thereby assuming joint
control of the risk. Finding concert of action liability unsuited to
DES litigation, the Sindell court noted that, at all pertinent times,
there was neither any showing of an industry standard and no
delegation of safety-related concerns to a third jarty, nor was there
any showing of joint control of the risk. The court also
remarked, tellingly, that while the application of enterprise liability
might be fair in litigation involving five to ten defendants, it did
57. Id. at 928. In discussing exceptions to the rule of the imposition of
liability, the court discusses Summers, where the court required defendants to
prove that they did not cause the plaintiffs injuries. 199 P.2d 1, 1-4 (Cal.
1948). Underlying the court's decision were such factors as: (1) the plaintiffs
inability, through no fault of his own to identify the tortfeasor; (2) the joint
culpability of the defendants, in that both fired negligently at a target they had
not determined to be prey; and (3) the defendants' superior position, when
contrasted to that of the plaintiff, to prove which one caused the injury. Id.
58. Id.
59. Sindell, 607 P.2d at 931.
60. Id. at 931-33.
61. Id. at 933-35.
62. 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). In Hall, the plaintiffs were unable
to identify the manufacturer of a blasting cap that injured a child. Id. at 359.
The court denied defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint brought under an
enterprise liability cause of action because the court believed the plaintiffs could
prevail. Id. at 376-78.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 366-67.
796 [Vol. 67
DEFENDANT INDETERMINACY
not follow that it was suited to litigation involving a large number
of defendants.
65
Writing for the Sindell majority, Justice Mosk proceeded sua
sponte to create a burden-shifting approach that conformed to the
facts of the Sindell litigation and litigation like it.66  Burden-
shifting would be fair and warranted, Justice Mosk wrote, upon a
plaintiffs predicate showing that: (1) the injury causing substance
caused his injury; (2) the injury causing product was fungible; (3)
the plaintiff could define a relevant market for the injury causing
product; and (4) the plaintiff had joined as defendants a substantial
share of the defendant producers that had sold DES during the
pertinent time period, i.e., the time during which the mother was
pregnant and taking DES.67 Upon satisfaction of this evidentiary
burden, the burden would shift to the defendants to demonstrate
individually that they had not produced the DES that the mother
had taken. Upon such a showing, a defendant would not be
liable. Defendants unable to exculpate themselves would be liable
for any plaintiffs proven harm in an amount proportionate to the
defendant's share of the market during the relevant time period.69
65. Sindell, 607 P.2d at 934.
66. Id. at 924.
67. Id. It can be seen that the "substantial share" requirement was intended
to bolster the cause in fact element of a DES claim. Id. at 937. As taken in the
aggregate, manufacturers representing a substantial share of the market would,
more likely than not, have produced the DES taken by the mother. Id. See also
Mullen v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 200 Cal. App. 3d 250, 255 n.6 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1988) (quoting Hannon v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 567 F. Supp. 90, 91 n.1
(E.D. La. 1983) (quoting Jonathan B. Newcomb, Note, Market Share Liability
for Defective Products: An Ill-Advised Remedy for the Problem of Identification,
76 Nw. U. L. REv. 300, 301-02 (1981))).
68. Such showings might be had by proof that the defendant did not
manufacture DES for human use, or that the defendant did not market its
product in the region in which the plaintiff resided, or that although the
plaintiff's memory of the DES she ingested was imperfect, she was able to recall
sufficient facts, such as size, color, or shape of the product, to permit a
defendant manufacturer to distinguish its product from the DES taken by the
mother. See Collins v. Eli Lilly & Co., 342 N.W.2d 37, 52 (Wis. 1984).
69. Sindell, 607 P.2d at 937. The Sindell court partly rested its reasoning
and theory on a student-written law review comment. Id. at 934-37. That
comment proposes seven requirements for a cause of action based on industry-
wide liability and suggests that if a plaintiff proves these elements, the burden of
proof of causation should be shifted to the defendants. Id. at 935. See
Comment, DES and a Proposed Theory of Enterprise Liability, 4 FORDHAM L.
REv. 963, 965 (1978) (requiring: (1) an insufficient, industry-wide standard of
safety as to the manufacture of the product; (2) the absent proof of the causative
agent is not due to any act of the plaintiff; (3) all defendants manufactured a
generically similar defective product; (4) plaintiff's injury was caused by this
defect; (5) defendants owed a duty to the class of which the plaintiff is a
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Nothing in market share liability relieved the plaintiffs burden of
proof regarding the underlying tort pursuant to negligence or strict
tort liability. In a later decision, Brown v. Superior Court ("Abbott
Laboratories ),70 the California Supreme Court determined that
liability would be proportionate only.
There are two principal rationales for applying market share
liability. The first, specifically adopted in Sindell, is that all
manufacturers and sellers of DES acted negligently, that an
individual firm's share of the market (say twenty percent)
represents the probability that it actually caused the individual
plaintiffs harm, and that imposing liability for twenty percent of
the damages represents a judgment that it should be liable to that
extent for the chance that it did in fact cause her damages. Indeed,
in mass tort cases, if courts in all states followed the identical
approach, the theory goes, a manufacturer's damages under the
market share analysis will converge with the actual harm it caused
to all plaintiffs. The second rationale is that, again, all market
participants acted negligently and that approaching liability from a
"risk contribution" to a national market would expedite resolution
of the claims while leaving unaltered the fairness of a market share
result.
III. RECEPTION OF SINDELL AND ITS VARIATIONS
Sindell prompted the high courts of several other states to adopt
market share liability in principle, while remaining free to tinker
with its particular applications as might best suit the law of the
jurisdiction. While there were several alternative approaches to
Sindell, one of the most influential merged concepts of
proportionate liability with risk contribution, namely, the New
York Court of Appeals' decision in Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co.7'
In Hymowitz, New York's highest court concluded that strict
adherence to Sindell, which based defendant-manufacturers'
market share on small geographic units, would result in years of
litigation and required a different approach, that of a national
member; (6) there is clear and convincing evidence that the plaintiff's injury was
caused by a product made by one of the defendants; (7) all defendants were
tortfeasors). But see Stapp v. Abbott Labs., No. C 344-407 (Cal. Super. Ct., Los
Angeles County) ("[T]he author of the Fordham comment is in the same
position that the [California] supreme court was in Sindell; it had never taken
one minute's evidence and it's apparent that whoever wrote that comment
doesn't know anything about the DES drug industry to put it bluntly.").
70. 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988).
71. 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1078 (N.Y. 1989).
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market.72 The court conceded that utilization of a national market
to determine the defendant-manufacturers' market share would
likely disfavor many manufacturers by imposing liability
"disproportion[ate to;L3. . .the actual injuries each manufacturer
caused in this State." As a consequence, liability pursuant to a
Hymowitz analysis could not be grounded in the Sindell hypothesis
that a manufacturer's market share would serve "over the run of
cases" 74 as a hypothetical proxy for causation of injury in the
state.75 The court further admitted that use of a national market
would not "provide a reasonable link between liability and the risk
created by a defendant to a particular plaintiff. 76  Instead, the
court justified its application of a national market share liability by
reasoning it would fairly "correspond to the over-all culpability of
each defendant, measured by the amount of risk of injury each
defendant created to the public-at-large., 77  A defendant could
avoid liability uion a showing that it did not market DES for
pregnancy use. 7" However, the manufacturer could not avoid
liability by showing that it did not market DES in a state or region
proximate to the plaintiff's mother; "it is merely a windfall for a
producer to escape liability solely because it manufactured a more
identifiable pill, or sold only to certain drugstores. These fortuities
in no way diminish the culpability of a defendant for marketing the
product, which is the basis of liability here. 79
Following Sindell, five states adopted some form of market
share liability. 80 However, nearly all courts have declined to
extend the doctrine to any products other than DES.8
72. Id. at 1076-78.
73. Id. at 1078.
74. Id. at 1076 (citing Sindell, 607 P.2d 924).
75. Id. at 1078.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. The five states adopting some form of California's market share liability
included: Wisconsin, Washington, New York, and Florida in DES cases, and
Hawaii in a case involving a blood product needed by hemophiliacs. See In re
Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether ("MTBE") Prod. Liab. Litig., 379 F. Supp. 2d 348,
375 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). The highest courts of five states have indicated that they
would not apply market share liability. See Sutowski v. Eli Lilly & Co., 696
N.E.2d 187 (Ohio 1998); Gordman v. Abbott Labs., 599 A.2d 1364 (R.I. 1991);
Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 N.E.2d 324 (I11. 990); Mulcahy v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 386 N.W.2d 67 (Iowa 1986); Zafft v. Eli Lilly & Co., 676 S.W.2d 241 (Mo.
1984).
81. See, e.g., Aaron D. Twerski, Market Share-A Tale of Two Centuries,
55 BROOK. L. REv. 869, 875 (1989) (observing courts' reluctance to extend
market share liability beyond DES litigation).
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A. Market Share Liability Adopted in DES Litigation
As introduced above, nine years after Sindell, the New York
Court of Appeals merged the concepts of risk contribution theory
with those of market share. In Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co.,82 also
a DES suit, the New York Court of Appeals announced a modified
version of the Sindell market share theory. The court held that a
market share case must be based on the national market for the
relevant product, rather than the share of the market in the state.
Additionally, if the defendant is a member of the market for a
product, the manufacturer will be held liable even if it did not
cause the individual plaintiff's injuries. Limiting the scope of
market share liability, the New York court described the DES
situation as a "singular" one.8 3 Later, in In re DES Market Share
Litigation,84 the same New York Court of Appeals reconsidered its
conclusion that DES plaintiffs should proceed in equity and
concluded instead that plaintiffs injured by DES and relying on a
market share theory are entitled to a jury trial on the issue of
market share. 5
In Collins v. Eli Lilly & Co., another DES suit, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court rendered another market share modification. 86 The
Wisconsin court rejected a strict application of Sindell market
share liability but adopted a variation of it that, it turned out,
facilitated the plaintiffs burden of proof even more dramatically
than had Sindell.8 7  The court adopted a "risk contribution"
approach to assessing the potential liability of any manufacturer,
relieving the plaintiff of the requirement that she bring before the
court defendants representing a substantial share of the DES
market at times pertinent to the litigation.88 The Collins court held
instead that the plaintiffs burden was merely to obtain in
82. 539 N.E.2d 1069. The decision in Hymowitz has been criticized as
flawed in that liability cannot be equated to actual harm caused. See Shackil v.
Lederle Labs., 561 A.2d 511, 533 (N.J. 1989) (O'Hem, J., dissenting)
(recognizing Hymowitz as perhaps the most controversial of the market share
decisions). But see Twerski, supra note 81, at 870 (praising Hymowitz for not
"paying senseless obeisance to tradition").
83. Hymowitz, 539 N.E.2d at 1075.
84. 591 N.E.2d 226 (N.Y. 1992).
85. Id. at 230-31.
86. 342 N.W.2d 37, 46-47 (Wis. 1984) (proportioning damages among
culpable defendants based upon the percentage of causal negligence attributable
to each).
87. Id. at 48. The primary factor that prevented Collins from following
Sindell was the practical difficulty of defiming and proving market share
liability. Id.
88. Id.
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personam jurisdiction over only one or more manufacturers, which
manufacturer(s) could, in turn, implead as many other
manufacturers as jurisdictional rules might permit. 89 Not only did
the court place the burden of aggregating putative defendants upon
the group-the manufacturers-most able to discharge it
efficiently, but it also placed this burden on a group-those
initially sued-who would be highly motivated to implead as
representative a group of defendants as possible. The burden of
proof would be on the manufacturers to establish that their
particular product was not taken, and, for those who could not
meet this burden, an apportionment of damages would be made by
the jury pursuant to the state's comparative negligence statute.
The court outlined some factors that could be used to analyze the
proportionate liability of defendants, including:
[W]hether the drug company conducted tests on DES for
safety and efficacy in use for pregnancies; to what degree
the company took a role in gaining FDA approval of DES
for use in pregnancies; whether the company had a small or
large market share in the relevant area; whether the
company took the lead or merely followed the lead of
others in producing or marketing DES; whether the
company issued warnings about the dangers of DES;
whether the company produced or marketed DES after it
knew or should have known of the possible hazards DES
presented to the public; and whether the company took an
affirmative steps to reduce the risk of injury to the public.9
It is this risk contribution modification of market share liability
that will provide a backdrop for one of the two significant
innovations in handling indeterminate defendant cases that will be
described below.92
B. Market Share Liability Rejected in DES Litigation
Even as the Sindell-Hymowitz-Collins line of cases prompted
courts to reevaluate their state tort laws in an attempt to hold DES
manufacturers responsible for injuries that their drugs had caused,
89. A "risk contribution" theory is proposed in Glen 0. Robinson, Multiple
Causation in Tort Law: Reflections on the DES Cases, 68 VA. L. REv. 713, 739
(1982) (observing that from the standpoint of fairness "the critical point is the
creation of a risk that society deems to be unreasonable, not whether anyone was
injured by it").
90. Collins, 342 N.W.2d at 50-51.
91. Id. at 53.
92. See discussion infra Part V.A-B.
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some courts have, in the name of policy, found that such
refashioning of traditional tort law is better suited for legislatures
than for courts. On numerous occasions, courts have rejected
market share liability as a basis for relief on grounds of public
policy.93 The extent of each court's analysis varies, although there
are certain common justifications. These courts recognized that
market share liability is too great a deviation from existing tort law
and, therefore, as the theory presently exists, not a viable
concept.
94
In Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., the Illinois Supreme Court held that
the market share theory of liability, in all its forms, is to be rejected
as an unsound theory that represents too great a deviation from
established tort principles, and the theory thus may not be applied
in cases brought by the plaintiffs who were exposed to DES.95 The
court rejected the theory on consideration of the difficulty of
establishing the defendants' percentages of the market.96 The court
also stated its concern that application of market share liability
might create the potential of disparate treatment between plaintiffs
who could and could not identify the specific manufacturer
responsible for DES, in that the plaintiff who could identify the
reasonable manufacturer takes the risk that the particular defendant
will be unable to assume financial responsibility for the injuries
caused. 
97
Likewise, in Tidler v. Eli Lilly & Co., applying Maryland law,
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia declined to adopt
the market share liability theory. 98 The court reasoned that the
theory requires that courts "build on a new foundation, not on the
structural underpinnings of the traditional common law of torts."
99
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. 560 N.E.2d 324, 345 (I11. 1990). The court stated that "[i]t [was]
tempting in this case to impose liability based on the fact that these companies
profited from the sale of the type of drug which may be responsible for the
plaintiff's injuries, regardless of the manufacturers' ability to cover these costs."
Id. The court considered, and rejected, policy reasons the plaintiffs proposed for
adopting the theory. Id. at 342.
96. Id. at 344.
97. Id. Smith quotes Judge Richardson, who, writing for the dissenters in
Sindell, argued that market share liability makes the entire drug industry "an
insurer of all injuries attributable to defective drugs of uncertain or unprovable
origin" and concluded that such a solution is an unreasonable overreaction in
attempting to achieve what is perceived as a socially satisfying result. Id.
(quoting Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 942-43 (Cal. 1980)
(Richardson, J., dissenting)).
98. 851 F.2d 418, 424 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (applying District of Columbia and
Maryland law).
99. Id.
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C. At the Boundaries: Beyond DES
Plaintiffs have attempted to extend market share liability to
contexts other than DES cases but with considerably less success.
Most notably, plaintiffs in cases with asbestos, lead-based paint,
and vaccines have attempted to apply market share liability.
Courts have curtailed the reach of this theory beyond DES by
emphasizing the notion that market share liability can apply only
when a product is perfectively "fungible." As the following
sketches of decisions illustrate, plaintiffs, unable to identify the
manufacturers of vaccines, asbestos, and lead pigments, must
satisfy causation in fact and have not, with rare exception, been
permitted to use market share liability to overcome their
difficulties. Conspicuous in its absence from most of the
decisional law is any thoughtful examination of the meaning of,
much less the rationale for the requirement of, fungibility as a
predicate for application of market share liability or its variants.
1. Vaccines
In the vaccine cases, the courts rejected market share liability
as a basis for relief, as the facts did not support recovery. The
plaintiff parents in Shackil v. Lederle Laboratories, unable to
identify the specific manufacturer of the DPT vaccine (a vaccine
for diphtheria, tetanus, and whooping cough) that caused their
daughter to be severely retarded, sued a number of manufacturers
that produced the vaccine and could, therefore, have sold the
vaccine responsible for her harm. 00 Plaintiffs argued for adoption
of a market share liability theory. The court determined that to
apply market share liability in a DPT case would frustrate public
policy and public health considerations and also that the absence of
a generically identical product produced a major distinction
between the vaccine in Shackil and DES because the DPT vaccine
in Shackil involved a defective batch but lacked the generic
defectiveness involved in the DES cases.' 0 1
100. See 530 A.2d 1287 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987), rev'd, 561 A.2d
511 (N.J. 1989). The court emphasized that the collective liability approach it
suggested would never come into play unless Shackil first proved that each
manufacturer's vaccine was a defective product. Id. at 1296.
101. Shackil, 561 A.2d at 521. Several other decisions rejected collective
liability claims against DPT vaccine makers before the New Jersey ruling in
Shackil. Id. at 519. See Chapman v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 861 F.2d 1515, 1520
n.7 (11 th Cir. 1988) (concluding that Georgia does not recognize any collective
liability theories).
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Not unlike Shackil, in Sheffield v. Eli Lilly & Co.,' 02 another
vaccine case, the court reemphasized and hammered home that
market share liability should not apply to a nongeneric "defective
batch" vaccine case, despite any difficulties of identification. The
court held that recovery could not be had under market share or
any other collective liability theory where the action was based on
an allegedly defective batch of the vaccine and not on any joint or
collective action of the manufacturers that resulted in a generically
defective vaccine.1
0 3
2. Asbestos
Probably the most conspicuous category of cases in which
market share or related liability theories failed to gain a foothold
has been that of asbestos litigation. 0 4 The courts overwhelmingly
have found that, as asbestos is not a single mineral but instead a
group of several different ones, it is not a single-formula, fungible
product that might permit application of market share liability.
There are six different asbestos silicates used in industrial
applications, and each presents a distinct degree of toxicity in
accordance with the shape and aerodynamics of the individual
fibers.' 0 5
Representative of such decisions in asbestos litigation, nearly a
decade after Sindell, a California appellate court decided Mullen v.
Armstrong World Industries, Inc. In that suit, three homeowners
filed a statewide class action suit against numerous manufacturers
102. 144 Cal. App. 3d 583, 583 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983). The Sheffield court
reasoned that the defect was not a design defect, as in Sindell, but that a
manufacturer had distributed a defective product. Id. at 594. Additionally,
unlike Sindell, the delay in discovering the alleged causation was in no way
related to the nature of the defective product or any other act or omission of the
unknown tortfeasor. Id.
103. Id, Furthermore, the "deep pocket" theory may be socially desirable as
a vehicle to insure that all victims of a defective product will be compensated,
but if applied indiscriminately to penalize the careful and careless producer
alike, it fails to act as a deterrent to the latter and may result in keeping
beneficial but potentially dangerous products (like vaccines) off the market. Id.
at 597.
104. The word "asbestos" is derived from the Greek word meaning
"inextinguishable," and the origin of its name reflects one of its principal
characteristics: fire resistance. Mullen v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 200
Cal. App. 3d 250, 255 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988). Asbestos has many qualities that
enhance commercial utility and it has figured in commercial production for
more then a century. See Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076,
1083 n.3 (5th Cir. 1973).
105. Mullen, 200 Cal. App. 3d at 255-56.
106. Id. at 250.
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of asbestos products used in residential housing construction,
alleging personal injury and property damage to their homes from
both the use of such products and the cost of asbestos removal.
10 7
Alleging the asbestos products were "functionally interchangeable"
and that no testing procedures existed to identify which defendant
made a particular asbestos-containing product, the complaint
sought to im 1 ose liability on defendants under a Sindell market
share theory.
Distinguishing DES litigation from that involving asbestos, the
Mullen court observed that DES, manufactured by hundreds of
companies pursuant to one formula, had "identical physical
properties and chemical compositions, and consequently all DES
prescribed to pregnant women created the same risk of harm."'1
0 9
Asbestos products, in contrast, the court wrote, "have widely
divergent toxicities . . . caused by a combination of factors,
including: the specific type of asbestos fiber, the physical
properties of the product itself, and the percentage of asbestos used
in the product."""
The Mullen decision would be joined by holdings of courts of
several other jurisdictions that determined that market share
liability should not be recognized in asbestos cases. The Ohio
Supreme Court rejected its application in Goldman v. Johns-
Manville Sales Corp.,"' in which the court reasoned that market
share liability is inappropriate where it cannot be shown that the
products are completely fungible."12 On similar facts, a Delaware
court rejected market share liability and reasoned further that any
change to market share liability should be left to the legislature.' 1
3
It is seen that given the nature of asbestos, a majority of courts
has refused to extend the doctrine of market share liability and its
107. Id. at 253.
108. Plaintiffs' argument that market share liability should be extended from
the DES field of Sindell to the asbestos industry proceeds on the premise that
DES and asbestos are simple equivalents. Id. at 255.
109. Id. at 253.
110. The asbestos family consists of more than thirty different minerals of
fibrous structure. See In re Related Asbestos Cases, 543 F. Supp. 1152, 1158
(N.D. Cal. 1982) (declining to extend market share liability to the field of
asbestos). The minerals' physical properties vary so that only six varieties are of
substantial economic value. Id. These six minerals are chrysoltile, crocidolite,
amosite, anthopyllite, tremolite, and actiolite. Id. These minerals are used in
various percentages depending on whether a primary, secondary, or consumer
use is being made of the asbestos product. Id.
111. 514N.E.2d691,692 (Ohio 1987).
112. Id.
113. Nutt v. A.C. & S. Co., 517 A.2d 690, 694 (Del. 1986) (exercising
judicial restraint in the products liability area).
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burden-shifting rules to actions brought against multiple suppliers
of asbestos products. However, in Wheeler v. Raybestos-
Manhattan,114 a California appeals court, on the particular facts of
an automobile brake pads case, applied market share liability."
5
The plaintiffs therein were allegedly exposed to asbestos fibers in
brake pads during an inspection and replacement of worn pads, a
process shown to release amounts of friable asbestos in the form of
dust containing asbestos generated by friction on the pads during
braking. The plaintiffs alleged that the pads were sufficiently
fungible for the purpose of application of market share liability
since all of the brake pads were composed solely of chryostile
asbestos fiber, a specific member of the asbestos family of
minerals, and all contained between forty and sixty percent
asbestos by weight.1' 6 The Wheeler court recognized that plaintiffs
who could meet the fungibility hurdle, seemingly specific to
chrysotile asbestos, were entitled to invoke the market share theory
of liability.
3. Lead-Based Paint Pigments
As with asbestos litigation, courts throughout the country have
been reluctant to adopt market share liability in lead paint
litigation. Ingestion of the lead carbonate component of lead
pigment that previously enjoyed widespread use in residences
works dreadful neurological damage to persons, particularly to the
infants and young persons most likely to ingest it in the form of
wood chips or to otherwise be exposed to it. Here too plaintiffs are
generally unable to identify the manufacturers of the pigment that
they ingested and have sought to rely on market share theory to
overcome that difficulty.
Representative of such litigation is Skipworth v. Lead
Industries Association, Inc.,117 in which the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court held that the lead paint to which the plaintiff was exposed,
causing lead poisoning, was not a fungible product, as lead
pigments had different chemical formulations, contained different
amounts of lead, and differed in potential toxicity. 1 8 The court
114. 8 Cal. App. 4th 1152, 1152 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
115. Id. at 1155-56.
116. Id.
117. 690 A.2d 169 (Pa. 1997). Parents of a minor brought a personal injury
action for injuries sustained allegedly due to ingestion of lead paint in their
home against manufacturers of lead pigment. Id. Testing of Skipworth's
residence revealed the presence of lead-based paint at various locations
throughout the home. Id.
118. Id. at 172-73.
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noted that adoption of market share liability would represent a
significant departure from the general rule requiring proof of
causation.' 19 The court also distinguished the relevant time period
in question in the case before it. The house in which the plaintiff
resided was built over one hundred years prior to the injury,
making identification of relevant markets for various time periods
a far greater task than was true of the already challenging task
before courts and litigants in DES litigation.
IV. THE MEANING OF "FUNGIBILITY"
The Sindell opinion is sparing in its references to DES as a
"fungible" product and did not place great emphasis on that
term. 20 As a result, "fungibility" has been used in several
different senses throughout the case law, with these different
meanings continually jumbled and confused. 121  Although the
success or failure of plaintiffs to show the "fungibility" of the
harmful agent soon became the pole star of market share analysis,
only recently, in the Wisconsin Supreme Court's lead pigment
decision Thomas ex rel. Gramling v. Mallett,122 discussed below,
did a state high court ever explain thoroughly what "fungibility"
means or why it is important. The leading treatise on tort law
simply observed that market share liability requires injury caused
by a "fungible" or "identical-type" product, without further
explanation.123 Various dictionary editions offer broad definitions,
such as that something is fungible when it is "of such a kind or
nature that one specimen or part may be used in place of another or
equal part in the satisfaction of any obligation ...capable of
119. Id. Because of the differences in bioavailability of lead pigment, a child
who ingests dust or chips of lead paint containing equal amounts of lead will not
generally develop equal elevation in internal lead level from the two paints. Id.
at 173. The differing formulae of lead paint has a direct bearing on how much
damage a lead paint manufacturer's product would cause. Id. at 173 & n.5.
120. Rostron, supra note 5, at 163 n.68. See also In re Dow Coming Corp.,
250 B.R. 298 (E.D. Mich. 2000). In re Dow Corning found that an absolute
predicate to application of the market share theory of products liability is that
the product in question be fungible and generic in nature; that is, one defendant
manufacturer's product must be indistinguishable from the next manufacturer's
product. Id. at 363.
121. See, e.g., In re New York State Silicone Breast Implant Litig., 631
N.Y.S.2d 491 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995). In that action, a theory of market share
liability was not applied to an action brought by silicone implant recipients
against the manufacturers of the implants, as the implants differed in design and
manufacture and, therefore, were not generic. Id. at 494.
122. 701 N.W.2d 523, 560 (Wis. 2005) (citing Rostron, supra note 5, at 163).
123. See PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 103, at 714 (W.
Page Keeton et al., eds., 5th ed. 1984).
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mutual substitution: interchangeable."124 As is set out below, the
Wisconsin court in Gramling was taken by the logic, the scientific
basis, and the fairness of the fungibility analysis contained in an
article of Allen Rostron entitled Beyond Market Share Liability: A
Theory of Proportional Share Liability for Nonfungible
Products, which prompted its conclusion that "a product can be
'fungible' in several different senses significant to application of
market share liability."'' 26
A. Functional Interchangeability
When the California Supreme Court referred to DES as a
"fungible" product in Sindell, it was using the term in the sense
that each manufacturer's version of the product at that time was
functionally interchangeable with other DES produced by myriad
other DES manufacturers. 127 Whether a product is fungible in the
sense of being functionally interchangeable obviously depends on
the function that one has in mind. As one judge put it, "for
signalling New Year's Eve, a blast from an auto horn and one from
a saxophone may be eguivalent as noise, but few would want to
dance to the former. ' 12  Whether a product is fungible is also a
matter of degree and is dependent on context.
Significant for market share liability purposes, this can pose
severe identification problems. Products that are functionally
interchangeable will often be intermingled. Knowing that all DES
products had the same effect, pharmacists filled prescriptions with
whatever brand of DES they had in stock in the correct dosage. 129
This exacerbated the difficulties for plaintiffs trying to prove the
manufacturer of the DES consumed by their mothers.
B. Physical Indistinguishability
Courts have also used the term "fungible" to describe products
that are physically indistinguishable from others. 130  Like
124. Gramling, 701 N.W.2d at 560 n.48 (setting forth other judicially relied-
upon dictionary definitions) (citing WEBSTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 922 (1986)).
125. See Rostron, supra note 5.
126. Id. at 163.
127. Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980).
128. Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 32 F. Supp. 2d 47, 51 (E.D.N.Y. 1998).
129. Sindell, 607 P.2d at 926.
130. See Rostron, supra note 5, at 164.
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functional interchangeability, this sort of fungibility is a matter of
degree. 131
The ability to physically distinguish two products matters to
market share liability and explains one reason a product might be
difficult for a plaintiff to attribute to a particular manufacturer.'
32
DES was by no means perfectly fungible in this sense because it
came in different forms, shapes, sizes, colors, and sometimes
carried unique lettering or scoring.'3 3  It was not the similar
appearance of DES that made for a severe identification dilemma.
The passage of time also made physical identification more
problematic.
C. Uniformity of Risk
DES was "fungible" in another crucial aspect. The sharing of
an identical or virtually identical chemical formula, as in DES,
meant that each manufacturer's product posed the same amount of
risk as every other manufacturer's product. 34  The products,
therefore, were "identically defective" with none being more or
less dangerous than the rest. This uniformity of risk was crucial to
market share liability. It is what made market share data the right
measure to use to apportion liability among DES manufacturers.
With all DES posing identical risk, each manufacturer's share of
overall sales should correspond roughly to its share of the overall
harm caused. 1
35
While the Sindell court used the term "fungible" to mean
functionally interchangeable, it is arguable that the uniformity of
risk posed by DES was the true key to the court's decision, even
though the court phrased it in terms of the "comparability" of "the
131. Id. Rostron offers the example of the difference between two brands of
a cola drink: in their original packaging they have an obvious physical
distinction, whereas after being poured from the can or bottle, the two beverages
might be completely indistinguishable in appearance. Id.
132. Id.
133. See McCormack v. Abbott Labs., 617 F. Supp. 1521, 1530 (D. Mass.
1985). In McCormack, the plaintiff's testimony was that the DES taken by her
mother during pregnancy was in the form of "little white pills" about the size of
saccharin tablets, and "little orange or little red pills," which were described as
very small, like "M & M's." Id. at 1527. The Upjohn Company, a defendant in
the case, had never developed, manufactured, advertised, sold, or resold DES in
any form other than a spherical gelatinous perle filled with fluid. Id.
134. See Rostron, supra note 5, at 165.
135. Id. at 166. Rostron explains fungibility requirements as applied by the
courts and argues for the elimination of the fungibility requirement in favor of a
broader concept he calls "proportional share liability." Id. at 151.
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damage that each manufacturer's product would do."'13 6 While the
court's application of a "comparability of damage" measure in
Sindell provided clarity in terms of the resolution of the litigation
before it, it did not bestow a very parochial and scientifically
recognizable reference point for courts to follow thereafter,
particularly in disputes involving products containing varying
amounts of a hazardous or toxic substance.
V. NOVEL MARKET SHARE LIABILITY APPROACHES
Twenty-six years have passed since the California Supreme
Court first applied market share liability in Sindell. With limited
exceptions, market share liability has remained largely a singular
response isolated to DES litigation. In 2005, two courts
reexamined market share liability, setting new precedent that
invites new ways of evaluating liability involving indeterminate
defendants in products liability or pollution claims. The first, a
products liability suit applying a risk contribution-market share
liability theme, examines the scientific integrity of defining
"fungibility" more broadly than the "chemical interchangeability"
standard as suggested in Sindell and as applied in several
subsequent decisions. The second, involving widespread actual
and threatened underground water contamination by accidental
release of a gasoline additive, applies market share liability to a
range of damage actions by holding that even though the pollution
in multiple sites involved pollutants of varying concentrations, the
final product in each case could fairly be characterized as a new,
"commingled product" to which market share liability could be
justly applied.
A. Thomas ex rel. Gramling v. Mallett
This action was brought on behalf of Thomas, a minor, against
lead carbonate manufacturers to recover damages for serious
136. In contrast, see Smith v. Cutter Biological, Inc., 823 P.2d 717, 733
(Haw. 1991), a blood component suit in which, in the dissent, Judge Moon
emphasized the majority's recognition of the varying risks posed by different
supplies of Factor VIII in these words:
The majority here admits that Factor VIII is not fungible, that is, it does
not pose the same risk of harm to users because . . . "[t]he reason is
obvious-the donor source of the plasma is not constant. Therefore,
Factor VIII is only harmful if the donor was infected; DES is inherently
harmful."
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neurological disorders.' 37 Thomas, contending the disorders were
caused by ingestion of paint pigment with white lead carbonate,
alleged claims of strict liability, negligence, civil conspiracy, and
enterprise liability. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals granted the
manufacturers' motion for summary judgment and concluded that
because Thomas had pursued remedies against one or more
landlords for their negligence in failing to abate lead paint hazards
in his prior residences, and had reached settlements in those cases,
there was no policy reason to extend Collins's risk contribution
theory. 138 The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed, identifying the
opportunity to extend the risk contribution-market share liability
doctrine advanced in Collins, theretofore reserved for DES cases,
to the claims of lead-based paint poisoning.'
39
In Gramling,140 the majority acknowledged that even in those
jurisdictions that were willing to apply some form of market share
liability to DES claims, the majority of courts that had heard lead
pigment poisoning claims by that date had declined to do so.'
4
'
The reasons such decisions had given fell generally into three
categories. First, some courts based their refusal on the fact that
the various lead pigment formulations marketed over pertinent
time periods varied. Second, the periods of time that would be
presented for determining the relevant market might be eighty or
ninety years, insofar as an infant of a modem family might ingest
or be exposed to lead paint fragments (or dust during home
remodeling) that could represent, layer by layer, decades of
application of paint from different paint and pigment
manufacturers. Third, the window of time during which the child
could have been exposed would often be measured in years,
particularly if families resided in multiple homes or apartments
over a period of time. In contrast, in a DES case, the relevant
window of exposure would be a single term of a mother's
pregnancy, or twelve weeks. Each of these three considerations
would bear, in an interconnected way, upon the accessibility of
records and other evidence that might be summoned to show the
137. Thomas ex rel. Gramling v. Mallet, 701 N.W.2d 523, 527 (Wis. 2005)
(discussing history of litigation).
138. Id.
139. Collins v. Eli Lilly & Co., 342 N.W.2d 37, 41 (Wis. 1984).
140. 701 N.W.2d 523.
141. Id. at 533, 550-51. See, e.g., Santiago v. Sherwin Williams Co., 3 F.3d
546, 549 (1st Cir. 1993) (declining to extend market share liability because
plaintiff could not establish the market); Skipworth v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 690
A.2d 169, 171-73 (Pa. 1997); Brenner v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 263 A.D.2d 165,
170 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (noting that New York courts have refused to extend
the market share theory beyond cases involving DES).
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likelihood that a particular manufacturer's product was a (let alone
the) likely cause of a child's lead poisoning.
The majority began its analysis with a discussion of its
noteworthy decision in Collins v. Eli Lilly & Co. '42 In Collins, the
court wrote that in order for a plaintiff to prove the typical tort
prima facie case against any particular manufacturer, she was
required to show by a preponderance of the evidence that her
mother took DES while pregnant, that DES caused her mother's
injuries, that defendant drug company manufactured DES during
her mother's pregnancy, and that defendant's production or
marketing of DES breached a legal duty. 143 It was obvious to the
Wisconsin court, as it had been to the California court in Sindell,
that on the facts of DES litigation, preservation of the orthodox
burden of proof presented an insurmountable obstacle to the
daughter whose mother was unable to identify the specific
manufacturer of the drug she took. In the interests of justice and
fundamental fairness, the court was faced with a choice either to
fashion a method of recovery, which would deviate from
traditional notions of tort law, or to permit possibly negligent
defendants to escape liability to an innocent, injured plaintiff. The
Collins court, as would the majority in Gramling, chose the
former.
144
Collins, of course, was a DES case and involved a
pharmaceutical compound that was produced according to a
chemically identical formula that allegedly caused harm. The
white carbonate used in paint pigment, in contrast, was made from
three different chemical formulas. The Gramling court readily
recognized this distinction. 145 The question left unanswered by
Collins was whether fungibility required chemical identity, and the
Gramling court concluded that it did not. 146 The court elected to
accept the invitation in Collins147 that risk contribution as a
"method of recovery could apply in situations which are factually
similar to the DES cases."' 4  The majority conceded that while
142. Gramling, 701 N.W.2d at 548-49.
143. Collins, 342 N.W.2d at 50.
144. Id.
145. 701 N.W.2d at 559.
146. Id. Justice Wilcox's dissent incorrectly construes Collins as requiring
plaintiffs to prove the type of DES taken by the mother, ignoring the fact that in
Collins, the plaintiff need only allege and prove that the defendant drug
company produced or marketed the drug if the plaintiff could not prove the type
of DES the mother took. Compare id. at 575-76 (Wilcox, J., dissenting), with
Collins, 342 N.W.2d at 50.
147. 342 N.W.2d 37.
148. Id. at 49.
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Gramling was not identical to Collins, its facts were sufficiently
similar to permit adoption of the Collins analysis,14 9 as were its
principal policy objectives.150
Lacking any body of decisional authority for defining
fungibility, the court referenced Allen Rostron's article in which he
writes that a product can be fungible in at least three different
ways.151 To Rostron, a product can be "functionally
interchangeable," and a product can be "physically
indistinguishable."' 52  Interchangeability is heavily reliant on
context and does not have precise definition. Whether a product is
fungible is a matter of degree and context for both the function at
issue and physical similarly reported. 53 Additionally, a product
can be fungible if it presents a uniformity of risk thus sharing an
identical or virtually identical chemical formula. 154 For example,
"while each milligram of DES presented the same amount of risk,
each DES pill did not, because the pills came in different
dosages."' 55 Thus, as in the lead pigment cases, the products may
contain different concentrations of hazardous substances but that
does not render them nonfungible.156 This approach, the Gramling
court determined, is flexible enough to accommodate situations
where products pose varying degrees of risk.
Gramling is not the first to fail to require absolute
interchangeability, and the dissent's unwillingness to recognize
149. Gramling, 701 N.W.2d at 557. In Collins, the Wisconsin court noted
that Article I, Section 9 had been interpreted as permitting under the constitution
a court-fashioned adequate remedy when an adequate remedy or forum does not
exist to resolve disputes or provide due process. 342 N.W.2d at 49. Like DES,
the entirely innocent plaintiffs may have been severely harmed by a substance
they had no control over and they may never know or be able to prove with
certainty which manufacturer produced or promoted the white lead carbonate
that caused the injuries. Id.
150. Gramling, 701 N.W.2d at 558. It was noted and discussed in Gramling
that "[w]hile 'fungibility' [has] become an obsession for courts discussing
market share liability, no court has ever explained thoroughly what 'fungibility'
means or why it is important." Id. at 560 (citing Rostron, supra note 5, at 163).
151. Id. at 560-61.
152. Id. at 561 (citing Rostron, supra note 5, at 163-65).
153. Id. See also discussion supra Part IV.A-C and accompanying notes.
154. Gramling, 701 N.W.2d at 562.
155. Id. at 561. It is the common dominator in the various white lead
carbonate formulas that matters, namely, lead. Id. at 562.
156. Wheeler v. Raybestos-Manhattan, 8 Cal. App. 4th 1152 (Cal. Ct. App.
1992). In Gramling, the dissent argues that the majority creates an irrefutable
presumption of causation and extends Collins to a point where every paint
manufacturer that produced white lead carbonate at one time or another is
absolutely liable because there is no realistic opportunity to prove that they did
not make the product that injured the plaintiff. 701 N.W.2d at 575 (Wilcox, J.,
dissenting).
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this weakens its position. In Wheeler v. Raybestos Manhattan, the
court held that while brake pads are not absolutely interchangeable,
and thus are not fungible from the viewpoint of an auto mechanic,
because they contain "roughly comparable" quantities of
chrysotile, they are sufficiently fungible for purposes of market
share liability as adopted in Sindell.757 The potential harm from
brake pads of the manufacturers were "more nearly equivalent."'
158
The Wheeler court distinguished Mullen because the brake pads at
issue were composed of a "single type of asbestos fiber, ... and
the amount of asbestos by weight in the pads varied within a
limited range."' 159 Thus, although brake pads containing asbestos
chrysotile fibers were not all manufactured from one single
chemical formula, it was held that "they are fungible ... by virtue
of containing roughly comparable quantities of the single asbestos
fiber." 60  The outer limits of what would constitute a varying
degree or status of being "roughly comparable" or "nearly
equivalent" were not considered by the court.r6l
The majority in Gramling recognized that the window during
which the possible injury causing white lead carbonate was placed
in a house that eventually harmed Thomas was drastically larger
than a nine month pregnancy. Equity, the majority concluded, did
not support reversing the balance established in Collins simply
because the "[p]igment [m]anufacturers benefited from
manufacturing and marketing white lead carbonate for a significant
amount of time."'
162
The majority also acknowledged the backdrop of relevant court
decisions declining the extension of market share liability under
these circumstances in order to determine whether Collins's risk
contribution theory should be recognized for white lead carbonate
claims. And yet, the court in Collins had written specifically that
its "method of recovery could ap~ply in situations which are
factually similar to DES cases. ' 6  Choosing to emphasize the
157. 8Cal. App. 4that 1155.
158. Id. at 1157.
159. Id.
160. Id. In Gramling, the dissent was unwilling to concede that the Wheeler
court's consideration of "nearly equivalent" risk of harm provided support for
fungibility and application of market share liability. 701 N.W.2d at 586
(Wilcox, J., dissenting). See also Zafft v. Eli Lilly & Co., 676 S.W.2d 241,
246-47 (Mo. 1984) (declining the opportunity to adopt the risk contribution
theory on the grounds that the theory has the potential of producing injustices
through delayed recoveries and inconsistent results).
161. Wheeler, 8 Cal. App. 4th 1152.
162. Gramling, 701 N.W.2d at 563.
163. Id. at 557 (citing Collins v. Eli Lilly & Co., 342 N.W.2d 37, 49 (Wis.
1984)). The majority adopted a straight application of the Wisconsin court's
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similarities over the differences, the majority found Collins
sufficiently similar on its facts to warrant application of the risk
contribution theory. As or more important than the factual
similarities, the Gramling court recognized that market share
liability was suited to lead pigment litigation for the same policy
reasons that had justified risk contribution-market share in DES
claims. 1 
64
"While each milligram of DES contained the same amount of
risk, each DES pill did not, because the pills came in different
dosages."' 6 5 Thus, as in the lead pigment cases, the products may
contain different concentrations of hazardous substances, but that
does not render them nonfungible. 166 This approach is flexible
enough to accommodate situations where products pose varying
degrees of risk. In Wheeler, although brake pads containing
asbestos chrysotile fibers were not all manufactured from one
single chemical formula, "they [were] fungible ...by virtue of
containing roughly comparable quantities of the single asbestos
fiber."' 67 The outer limits of what would constitute a "varying
degree" or "roughly comparable" were not considered by the
. . 168majonty.
Even under the relaxed causation standards announced in
Collins, the court still required plaintiff to prove "that the
defendant drug company reasonably could have contributed in,169
some way to the actual injury." Where Collins involved a nine
month pregnancy, Gramling involves a much longer time frame
within which the product alleged to have caused injury may have
been manufactured and distributed. Using the reasoning of
Skipworth v. Lead Industries Association, Inc. 0 and the factually
uncertain time frame of seventy-five to eighty years, many of the
defendants in this case were not participants in the white lead
carbonate market for significant periods of time from 1900 to
1980. Gramling's inability to identify a narrow time frame in
which to apply the Collins risk contribution theory is dispositive
because, without a definitive time frame, the defendants will be
burden-shifting analysis in Collins and applied it to the lead carbonate claims.
See id.
164. Id. at 565.
165. Id. at 561 (citing Rostron, supra note 5, at 166).
166. Id. See also Wheeler, 8 Cal. App. 4th at 1155-56.
167. Wheeler, 8 Cal. App. 4th at 1156.
168. Gramling, 701 N.W.2d at 575 (Wilcox, J., dissenting).
169. Id. at 577 n.10 (Wilcox, J., dissenting).
170. 690 A.2d 169 (Pa. 1997).
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unable to prove that they did not produce the injury causing
product in question. 171
The dissent argues that Collins explicitly rejected a broader
theory of risk contribution that would have held manufacturers of
DES liable without regard to whether they produced the product
during the nine months the mother was exposed to it. 72 In reality,
however, the dissent distorts the majority opinion as holding that
for risk contribution-market share, each defendant will have
"contributed to the risk of injury to the public and, consequently,
the risk of injury to individual plaintiffs . . . ,,17' The majority
merely recognized that in shaping market share liability in Collins,
the court looked at the measure of culpability of the defendant drug
companies for producing and marketing the drug.1
7 4
B. In Re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether ("MTBE") Products
Liability Litigation
In In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether ("MTBE') Products
Liability Litigation, 75 the federal district court for the Southern
District of New York, in an opinion by Judge Scheindlin, applied
the principles of market share liability, fashionin7a new collective
liability to encompass the action before the court.
" 6
Tracing MTBE and other groundwater contaminants into the
hands of a particular defendant is often a difficult task because,
once released into the environment, chemicals generally lack
characteristics that differ from manufacturer to manufacturer.
MTBE manufactured by one defendant is impossible to distinguish
from MTBE manufactured by another entity once in the aquifer. 177
As a result of these difficulties, MTBE plaintiffs, be they owners
of private wells or persons whose municipal water has been
contaminated, have sought to impose on defendants a variety of
171. Gramling, 701 N.W.2d at 558. The majority notes that "given the
disturbing number of victims of lead poising from ingesting lead paint and given
that white lead carbonate was the overwhelming pigment added to that paint, it
is clear from the summary judgment record that [the court is] not dealing with an
isolated or unique set of circumstances." Id.
172. Id. at 576 (Wilcox, J., dissenting).
173. Id. at 558.
174. Id. at 550.
175. 379 F. Supp. 2d 348, 348 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
176. Id. at 377-78. The gasoline additive MTBE (methyl tertiary butyl ether)
is a "chemical compound produced from methanol and isobutylene, a byproduct
of the gasoline refining process. It is highly soluble in water and does not
readily biodegrade," meaning it is capable of existing in an underground aquifer
for many decades. Id. at 364-65.
177. Id. at 365.
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collective liability theories that would permit recovery without the
necessity of product identification. 1
78
In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether ("MTBE") Products Liability
Litigation arose from the alleged current and threatened
contamination of groundwater with the additive from plaintiffs in
fifteen states.' 79 MTBE is a particularly virulent pollutant. A
byproduct of the refining process, it is carcinogenic in animals and
is "highly soluble in water and does not readily biodegrade."' 80 Its
solubility permits it to invade any water source with which it
comes into contact, and its persistence, potentially decades long, is
greater than that of other gasoline components. It renders water
unfit for consumption, and, adding insult to injury, MTBE
contamination "imparts a foul taste and odor to water."
181
Compounding, if you will, a plaintiffs problem in identifying the
producer or producers of the contaminant, it lacks any chemical
signature. This impediment to identifying a responsible producer
is magnified by the fact that industry practice "involves complex
arrangements whereby defendants trade, barter or otherwise
exchange product[s] for delivery," and that gasoline containing
MTBE "is commingled during its transmission via pipeline from
refineries to distribution centers.' ' 8
2
At some point after 1979, gasoline producers began to take the
opportunity to modify waste MTBE into a product that had a
commercial value, and they did so by oxygenating it to boost
octane levels. While it was true that the Clean Air Act of 1990183
required the use of oxygenates, alternatives to oxygenated MTBE
existed. 184  The defendants knew of the contamination "crisis"
associated with underground storage tanks and other sources and
178. Id. at 371-77. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B(2)
cmt. e (1965).
179. 379 F. Supp. 2d at 362. The plaintiffs involved in the multi-district
litigation arising from the defendants' alleged contamination filed suit in fifteen
states: Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania,
Vermont, Virginia, and West Virginia. Id. The court's task included the
prediction of how the pertinent legal issues would be determined under the
individual law of these states. Id. at 367 ("Where the substantive law of the
forum state is uncertain or ambiguous, the job of the federal courts is to
carefully predict how the highest court of the forum state would resolve
uncertainty or ambiguity."). See also Travelers Ins. Co. v. 633 Third Assoc., 14
F.3d 114, 119 (2d Cir. 1994).
180. In re MTBE, 379 F. Supp. 2d at 365.
181. Id. "MTBE is carcinogenic in animals and may be carcinogenic in
humans, as well." Id.
182. Id.
183. Clean Air Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 7545(m) (2000).
184. In re MTBE, 379 F. Supp. 2d at 365.
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not only shared this information with their trade association,
including the American Petroleum Institute ("API"), but also acted
in concert "to mislead plaintiffs, the EPA, [Congress], downstream
handlers, and the public about the hazards of adding MTBE to
gasoline.'
185
The defendants moved pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure for the complete dismissal of all the complaints. While
raising many issues, defendants' motion to dismiss focused in
particular on the problem of product identification. 186 Defendants
argued that the complaints from all fifteen states must be dismissed
because the plaintiffs failed to identify which defendant's MTBE-
containing gasoline proximately caused their harm.' 87 If plaintiffs
could not show which product was responsible for causing their
injuries, their cases could not survive unless they could proceed on
a theory of collective liability.' 88 The plaintiffs, in turn, asserted
that they could not identify the wrongdoer based on the fungible
nature of the MTBE and that their litigation was suited for
application of some variation of the familiar devices for shifting of
the conventional burden of proof'
189
The court went through a detailed discussion of various forms
of collective liability, describing in turn: (1) alternative liability;
(2) concert of action liability; (3) enterprise liability; and (4)
market share liability.190 With regard specifically to the theory of
alternative liability, the court described the theory now embodied
in Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 433B(3), 19 1 which is
underpinned by a policy that proven wrongdoers should not be
permitted "to escape liability merely because the nature of their
conduct and the resulting harm has made it difficult or impossible
to prove which of them caused the harm."' 92  The court
acknowledged that alternative liability might not be perfectly
suited to the MTBE litigation, in that the doctrine had traditionally
been applied in cases where defendants' conduct was simultaneous
185. Id. at 366. The court later noted that defendants had also misled
Congres3. Id.
186. Id. at 362.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 372-77. For a discussion of these theories, see supra Part II.A. 1-3.
191. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B(3) (1965).
192. In re MTBE, 379 F. Supp. 2d at 373 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 433(B)(3) cmt. f(1965)).
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in time, was of the same character, created the same risk of harm,
and where all potential tortfeasors were joined as defendants. 193
Turning to market share liability, the court examined the
language of Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, 194 in
which the American Law Institute offers these considerations to
courts evaluating the suitability of applying market share liability
to a particular law suit:
In deciding whether to adopt a rule of [market share]
liability, courts have considered the following factors: (1)
the generic nature of the product; (2) the long latency
period of the harm; (3) the inability of plaintiffs to discover
which defendant's product caused plaintiffs harm, even
after exhaustive discovery; (4) the clarity of the causal
connection between the defective product and the harm
suffered by plaintiffs; (5) the absence of other medical or
environmental factors that could have caused or materially
contributed to the harm; and (6) the availability of
sufficient "market share" data to support a reasonable
apportionment of liability.
Judge Scheindlin suggested that "MTBE contamination
presents as compelling a circumstance for the application of
market share liability as does DES.' 95 The court concluded that
great weight should be given to factor one: "the fungible nature of
the goods creates the necessity for using the market share theory
and ensures fairness in apportioning liability.' ' 196  The court
concluded that at the very least, factors one, three, and four applied
in the MTBE context. 19 " MTBE-containing gasoline is a fungible
product because the brands are interchangeable and because
different concentrations of MTBE in different batches of gasoline
do not affect its ability to contaminate ground water. The court
went so far as to say that the fungible nature of MTBE was perhaps
even more evident than in DES cases because while DES pills
could be distinguishable by appearance (e.g., color, shape, or size
of pills), it is inherently difficult to identify the refiner that caused
plaintiffs' injuries from MTBE, as it lacks even a chemical
193. Id. "Market share liability is uniquely suited to fungible product cases
because such products (1) create the problem of non-identification in the first
place and (2) pose equal risks of harm to those exposed to the product." Id. at 376.
194. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 15 cmt. c (1998)).
195. Id. at 377.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 376.
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signature. 198 Factor two, on the other hand, can be considered to
cut against application of market share liability because "MTBE
does not have a long latency period of harm."' 99 It contaminates
wells soon after it has reached the underground water.
200
Consideration of factors five and six seemingly suggested that
there were no additional impediments to imposition of some form
of market share liability. Contamination occasioned by MTBE is
readily discerned. The presence of other pollutants does not
require a finding of nonliability if the MTBE remains a producing
cause of the contamination. Also, the modem nature of the entire
problem ensures that industry and other records are and will
remain indefinitely available.
Despite the apparent support that the Restatement provision
might give to the application of some form of market share
liability, the court saw its task as the fashioning of a theory of
multiple liability that would best suit the circumstances of jointly
caused environmental harm, and one which the court could predict
that states that had entertained the rationale of market share
liability would adopt. Judge Scheindlin named it the "commingled
product" theory.20 ' It would be applicable when "certain gaseous
or liquid products (e.g., gasoline, liquid propane, alcohol) of many
suppliers were present in a completely commingled or blended
state at the time and place that the risk of harm occurred and the
commingled product caused a single indivisible injury.''20 "Under
this theory, each refiner actually caused the injury."203 Liability
198. Id. Defendants have repeatedly represented that petroleum products are
mixed during transportation and that gasoline may be provided by any refiner
whose product is in the chain of supply. Id. at 377 n.105. But see Conley v.
Boyle Drug Co., 570 So. 2d 275, 285 (Fla. 1990) (noting that some DES
plaintiffs had been able to identify the manufacturer of the injury-causing DES).
199. In re MTBE, 379 F. Supp. 2d at 377.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 377-78. The court offered this illustration:
[A]ssume that the petroleum products often refiners are commingled in
an underground storage tank. These ten products are completely
fungible and blended, combined or commingled into a single batch.
Each refiner supplied ten percent of the total volume of product in the
tank. If twenty percent of the petroleum in the tank leaks into the
ground, it is not reasonable to assume that the harm resulting from this
leak was caused by the products of only two refiners (each supplying
ten percent), and to require plaintiffs to prove which two proximately
caused the harm. Because the petroleum products were commingled to
form a new mixture, each of the ten refiners contributed to the injury in
proportion to the amount of product that each supplied.
Id. at 378.
203. Id.
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would be several only, due to the risk that defendants whose
contribution might be "small and insignificant" in relation to the
total harm would be caused "disproportionate hardship." As for
the other defendants, "[d]amages should be apportioned by proof
of a defendant's share of the market at the time a risk of harm was
created to a class of potential victims."2°4 The defendant could
exculpate itself with proof that "its product was not present at the
relevant time or in the relevant place, and therefore could not be
part of the new commingled or blended product." 205  For the
commingled product-market share theory to apply, plaintiffs would
be required to identify those defendants "whom they believe
contributed to the commingled product that caused their injury[,]"
a task that would require "investigation so that they can make a
good faith identification of the defendants whom they believe
caused their injury., 20 6  While it would not be necessary that
plaintiffs name all potential tortfeasors, they would have an
incentive to name as many as they could "to maximize recovery as
defendants would only be liable for their share of the damages."
20 7
The cases applying some form of collective liability all have
one commonality: they allow for judicial discretion. Accordingly,
"from time to time courts have fashioned new approaches in order
to permit plaintiffs to pursue a recovery when the facts and
circumstances of their actions raised unforeseen barriers to
relief., 20 8 Such as the existing parameters of liability theories
stand, the court suggests that In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether
("MTBE") demands one more theory-a modification of market
share liability.20 9
VI. CONCLUSION
Those predicting that Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories 210 would
presage a tidal surge of adoptions in seemingly related collective
liability litigation would be disappointed as they learned that the
California Supreme Court had simply, while innovatively, decided
the case before it-a potential collective liability action involving
a fungible (physically interchangeable) product. It would take
many years for the Wisconsin Supreme Court to revisit Sindell and
its own adoption of a risk contribution variant of market share
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 377.
209. Id.
210. 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980).
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liability2 11 that would propose a renewed inquiry into the meaning
of the talismanic fungibility requirement of market share liability
and that fungibility meant not only physical indistinguishability but
also functional interchangeability and uniformity of risk. One
cannot tell at this time, but Thomas ex rel. Gramling v. Mallet 2
at the very least invites courts, and particularly those courts that
have already adopted one or another form of market share liability,
to consider its suitability to litigation involving substances other
than DES.
In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether ("MTBE") Products Liability
Litigation2 13 stands likewise as an innovative and promising
treatment of environmental contamination litigation. On its facts,
the litigation presented two features that might otherwise preclude
recovery for plaintiffs: (1) the product had no chemical signature
that would aid in defendant identification; and (2) by the industry's
very method of marketing and distribution, gasoline containing
MTBE would be mixed, blended, and exchanged into
indistinguishability by the time any potential contamination might
occur. By her adoption of a "commingled product" approach to
market share liability, Judge Scheindlin suggested that states could
avoid the denial of recovery to plaintiffs theretofore disappointed
by the fortuity of an industry practice of blending and mixing its
products inter se.
Courts applying common law have always been charged with
considerations not only of applying the established law of a
jurisdiction but also with reaching just and equitable decisions
when application of existing law might preclude it. The thoughtful
decisions of the Wisconsin Supreme Court's Thomas ex rel.
Gramling v. Mallett and the federal district court's In re MTBE
Products Liability Litigation provide that justice and equity and, in
so doing, open (and reopen in turn) very important means of
achieving justice in collective liability suits beyond the boundaries
of DES litigation.
211. Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 342 N.W.2d 37,48 (Wis. 1984).
212. 701 N.W.2d 523, 567 (Wis. 2005).
213. 379 F. Supp. 2d 348, 376-78 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
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